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I introduce bankruptcy into a complete markets model with a continuum of ex ante
identical agents who have power utility. Shares in a Lucas tree serve as collateral.
Bankruptcy gives rise to a second risk factor in addition to aggregate consumption
growth risk. This liquidity risk is created by binding solvency constraints. The risk
is measured by one moment of the wealth distribution, which multiplies the standard
Breeden-Lucas stochastic discount factor. The economy is said to experience a negative
liquidity shock when this growth rate is high, a large fraction of agents faces severely
binding solvency constraints and the trading volume is low in ¯nancial markets. The
adjustment to the Breeden-Lucas stochastic discount factor induces time variation in
equity, bond and currency risk premia that is consistent with the data.
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11 Introduction
I develop a model of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents who have power utility
with risk aversion coe±cient °, complete markets, but imperfect enforcement of contracts.
Because households can declare themselves bankrupt and escape their debts, they face en-
dogenous solvency constraints that restrain their resort to the bankruptcy option. In the
benchmark calibration, the risk associated with these solvency constraints delivers an equity
premium of 7 percent, a risk-free rate of 1 percent and substantial variation in equity risk
premia, as well as an upward sloping yield curve, consistent with the data. This variation
in risk premia is driven by shocks to the wealth distribution induced by these solvency con-
straints. The fraction of the economy's endowment yielded by the Lucas tree plays a key role
in my economy. If the labor share of aggregate income is one, all wealth is human wealth,
the solvency constraints always bind and there can be no risk sharing. As the fraction of
wealth contributed by the Lucas tree increases, risk sharing is facilitated.
An economy that is physically identical but with perfect enforcement of contracts forms a
natural benchmark with which to compare my model. Because assets only re°ect aggregate
consumption growth risk in this benchmark representative agent model (Lucas (1978) and
Breeden (1979)), two quantitative asset pricing puzzles arise. These puzzles follow from the
fact that aggregate consumption growth in the US is i.i.d. and not volatile. First, risk premia
are small for plausible levels of risk aversion (Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Mehra and
Prescott (1985)), and second, risk premia do not vary in this economy while they do in the
data (see e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). My model produces an additional risk factor
that addresses these puzzles.
Since aggregate endowment growth is i.i.d., there are no built-in dynamics in risk premia.
Beyond the constant risk in the aggregate endowment process, the bankruptcy technology
contributes a second source of time-varying risk, the risk associated with binding solvency
constraints1. I call this liquidity risk. In the model without solvency constraints households
consume a constant share of the aggregate endowment, governed by ¯xed Pareto-Negishi
weights. In the case of limited commitment these weights increase each time the solvency
constraint binds. The average of these increases across households contributes a multiplica-
tive adjustment to the standard Lucas-Breeden SDF ¯¸
¡°
t+1 (stochastic discount factor): the
growth rate of the °¡1-th moment of the distribution of stochastic Pareto-Negishi weights,






1This paper follows He and Pearson (1991) and Luttmer (1992) in exploring solvency constraints as a
device for understanding asset pricing anomalies.
2This last component re°ects the aggregate shadow cost of the solvency constraints. If this
growth rate is high, a large fraction of agents is constrained, trading volume is low and the
economy is said to be hit by a negative liquidity shock. Figure 1 plots these liquidity shocks
g° in the top panel and the trading volume in the bottom panel for 55 periods simulated
from a calibrated version of my model. The aggregate trade volume in ¯nancial markets
drops by 20 % when there is a large liquidity shocks, after which it gradually recovers. The
shaded areas indicate low aggregate consumption growth states. There is a growing body
of evidence that aggregate liquidity risk is priced, both from the cross-section and the time-
series variation in stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). This papers delivers a
theoretical underpinning for these ¯ndings in a model with solvency constraints as the only
trading friction.
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Figure 1: Liquidity Shocks and Trading Volume In the top panel, the full line is the aggregate liquidity
shock g° over 55 years, generated by simulating the model. In the bottom panel, the full line is the aggregate trading volume







d©0 over 55 years. The shaded areas are low aggregate
consumption growth states. ° is 7, ® is 7.5% and ¯ is .95.
The wealth distribution dynamics increase the unconditional volatility of the SDF if nega-
tive liquidity shocks occur when aggregate consumption growth is low (recessions). Liquidity
shocks in recessions emerge from the properties of the labor income process when the disper-
sion of idiosyncratic labor income shocks increases in recessions. Households would like to
borrow against their income in the \high idiosyncratic states" to smooth consumption but
they are not allowed to, because they would walk away from the contract when that state of
the world is realized. The labor risk channel has support in the data. Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron (2004) argue that the conditional standard deviation of labor income shocks more
3than triples in recessions.
Leading asset pricing models cannot generate enough variation in the Sharpe ratio. Let-
tau and Ludvigson (2003) call this the Sharpe ratio volatility puzzle. The wealth distribution
dynamics of my model endogenously generate more time-variation in the conditional volatil-
ity of the SDF than competing equilibrium models. The liquidity shocks are largest when a
recession hits after a long expansion. In long expansions, there is a buildup of households
in the left tail of the wealth distribution: more agents do not encounter states with binding
constraints and they deplete their ¯nancial assets because interest rates are lower than in
the representative agent economy. When the recession sets in, those low-wealth agents with
high income draws encounter severely binding constraints and the left tail of the wealth
distribution is erased. After the recession, the conditional market price of risk decreases
sharply.
To deal with a continuum of consumers and aggregate uncertainty, I extend the methods
developed by and Krueger (1999). Building on work by Atkeson and Lucas (1992,1995),
Krueger computes the equilibrium allocations in a limited commitment economy without
aggregate uncertainty, in which households are permanently excluded upon default. These
methods cannot handle aggregate uncertainty. The use of stochastic Pareto-Negishi weights
(Marcet and Marimon (1999)) allows me to state an exact aggregation result: equilibrium
state prices depend only on the °¡1-th moment of the distribution of weights and I extend this
result to the case of recursive utility. This reduces the problem of forecasting the multiplier
distribution -the state of the economy- to one of forecasting a single moment.
There is a growing literature on collateral constraints and asset prices. Geanakoplos and
Zame (1998)(henceforth GZ) consider an environment in which households can default on
their promises at any time, and ¯nancial securities are only traded if the promises associated
with these securities are backed by collateral. What distinguishes my setup from GZ is
the fact that only outright default on all promises is allowed, not default on individual
obligations. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) develop a computational algorithm for an in¯nite
horizon version of the GZ economy.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section of the paper describes the en-
vironment. The third section discusses the equilibrium allocations prices, using stochastic
Pareto-Negishi weights. This section can be skipped by those not interested in the mechan-
ics of the model. The fourth section discusses the results; the ¯fth section discusses the
computation. All the proofs are in the appendix.
42 Environment and Equilibrium
2.1 Uncertainty
The events s = (y;z) take on values on a discrete grid S = Y £Z where Y = fy1;y2;:::;yng
and Z = fz1;z2;:::;zmg: y is household speci¯c and z is an aggregate event. Let st = (yt;zt)
denote an event history up until period t: This event history includes an individual event
history yt and an aggregate event history zt: I will use s¿ ¸ st to denote all the continuation







0jy;z) for all z 2 Z;y 2 Y:
I assume a law of large numbers holds such that the transition probabilities can be interpreted
as fractions of agents making the transition from one state to another. In addition, I assume
there is a unique invariant distribution ¼z(y) in each state z : by the law of large numbers
¼z(y) is also the fraction of agents drawing y when the aggregate event is z: (S1;F;P) is
a probability space where S1 is the set of all possible histories and P is the corresponding
probability measure induced by ¼: The transition probabilities for idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks are assumed to be independent.






I assume the transition matrix for idiosyncratic events y, Á(y0jy), satis¯es monotonicity
and there are no absorbing states, Á(y0jy) >> 0. Finally, I also assume the aggregate shocks
are independent over time:




2.2 Preferences and Endowments
There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1. There is a single consumption good and














5where ° is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion.
The economy's aggregate endowment process fetg depends only on the aggregate event
history: et(zt) is the realization at aggregate node zt. Each agent draws a labor income share
b ´(yt;zt) as a fraction of the aggregate endowment in each period. Her labor income share only
depends on the current individual and aggregate event. f´tg denotes the individual labor
income process ´t(st) = b ´(yt;zt)et(zt);with st = (st¡1;y;z). I assume b ´(yi+1;zt) > b ´(yi;zt)
and b ´(yt;zt) >> 0 in all states of the world.
There is a Lucas (1978) tree that yields a non-negative dividend process fxtg: The
dividends are not storable but the tree itself is perfectly durable. The Lucas tree yields a
constant share ® of the total endowment, the remaining fraction is the labor income share.






0) = (1 ¡ ®); (2)
for all z0. An increase in ® translates into proportionally lower b ´(y;z) for all (y;z).
Agents are endowed with initial non-labor wealth (net of endowment) µ0: This represents
the value of this agent's share of the Lucas tree producing the dividend °ow in units of time
0 consumption. £0 denotes the initial distribution of wealth and endowments (µ0;y0).
2.3 Market Arrangements
Claims to one's entire labor income process f´tg cannot be traded directly while shares in
the Lucas tree can be traded. Households can write borrowing and lending contracts based
on individual labor income realizations. I use Át(st) to denote an agent's holdings of shares
in the Lucas tree: In each period households go to securities markets to trade Át(st) shares in
the tree at a price pe
t(zt) and a complete set of one-period ahead contingent claims at(st;s0)
at prices qt(st;s0): at(st;s0) is a security that pays o® one unit of the consumption good if
the household draws private shock y0 and the aggregate shock z0 in the next period with
s0 = (y0;z0): qt(st;s0) is today's price of that security. In this environment the payo®s are
conditional on an individual event history and the aggregate event history rather than just
the aggregate state of the economy.
An agent starting period t with initial wealth µt(st) buys consumption commodities in













0) · µt: (3)
6If the next period's state is st+1 = (st;s0), her wealth is given by her labor income, the value
of her stock holdings -including the dividends issued at the start of the period- less whatever
she promised to pay in that state:
µt+1(s


















labor income value of tree holdings contingent payo®
2.4 Enforcement Technology
In this literature, it has been common to assume that households can be excluded from
¯nancial markets forever when they default, following Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocher-
lakota (1996). I allow agents to ¯le for bankruptcy. When a household ¯les for bankruptcy,
it loses all of its asset but its labor income cannot be seized by creditors and it cannot be
denied access to ¯nancial markets (see Lustig (2000) for a complete discussion).

















These borrowing constraints follow endogenously from the enforcement technology if we
rule out borrowing constraints that are too tight (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000)); these
constraints only bind when the participation constraint binds. If the agent chooses to default,
her assets and that period's dividends are seized and transferred to the lender. Her new
wealth level is that period's labor income:
µt+1(s
t+1) = b ´(yt+1;zt+1)et+1(z
t+1):
If the next period's state is st+1 = (st;s0) and the agent decides not to default, her wealth is
given by her labor income, the value of her tree holdings less whatever she promised to pay
in that state:
µt+1(s












This default technology e®ectively provides the agent with a call option on non-labor wealth
at a zero strike price. Lenders keep track of the borrower's asset holdings and they do not
buy contingent claims when the agent selling these claims has no incentive to deliver the
goods. The constraints in (4) just state that an agent cannot promise to deliver more than
7the value of his Lucas tree holdings in any state s0:
Bankruptcy and Permanent Exclusion Two key di®erences between bankruptcy and
permanent exclusion deserve mention. First, the bankruptcy constraints in (4) only re-
quire information about the household's assets and liabilities. To determine the appropriate
borrowing constraints in the case of permanent exclusion, the lender needs to know the bor-
rower's endowment process and her preferences (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). This type
of information is not readily available and costly to acquire. Moreover, the borrower has an
incentive to hide his private information. Second, in the case of bankruptcy it is immaterial
whether or not the household actually defaults when the constraint binds. The lender is paid
back anyhow and the borrower is indi®erent as well. Households could randomize between
defaulting and not defaulting when the constraint binds.
These collateral constraints are much tighter than the ones that decentralize the con-
strained e±cient allocations when agents can be excluded from trading (see Section 3.2) and
they support less risk sharing as a result.
2.5 Sequential Equilibrium
The de¯nition of equilibrium is standard. Each household is assigned a label that consists
of its initial ¯nancial wealth µ0 and its initial state s0. A household of type (µ0;s0) chooses



























0) · µt; (5)






































8The de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium is straightforward.
De¯nition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints for initial distribution
£0 over (µ0;y0) consists of trading strategies fat(s0;µ0;st)g; fct(µ0;st)g and fÁt(µ0;st)g and
prices fqt(st;s0g and fpe




















t)d£0 = 1 for all z
t
To prevent arbitrage opportunities in my economy for unconstrained agents in some state






This follows immediately from the household's ¯rst order condition and the observation that
same households with positive measure are unconstrained in each node zt+1.
3 Characterizing Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
To facilitate the analysis, I restate the household problem in a time zero trading environment
and I de¯ne the analogue to Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Krueger (1999)'s equilibrium
concept. Pareto-Negishi weights summarize a household's history of shocks. The stochastic
discount factor depends on the growth rate of the 1n°-th moment of the weight distribution.
This section can be skipped by the reader who wants to get to the asset pricing results.
3.1 Solvency Constraints
The collateral constraints in the sequential formulation can be restated as restrictions on the
price of two claims. ¦zt [fdg] denotes the price at node zt in units of zt consumption of a
claim on fdt(st)g
1
t=0 : The collateral constraints are equivalent to the following restriction on
the price of two claims, one on consumption and one on labor income:
¦st [fcg] ¸ ¦st [f´g]; for each s
t: (7)
93.2 Solvency Constraints
First, I show that imposing these solvency constraints is equivalent to imposing participation
constraints that prevent default in an environment where agents can default without being
excluded from trading. In other words, these solvency constraints are not too tight.
Bankruptcy technology Let ·t(st) be the continuation utility associated with bankruptcy,





t) s.t. ¦st [fc
0g] · ¦st [f´g];
and such that the participation constraints are satis¯ed in all following histories s¿ ¸ st:
Let U(fcg)(st) denote the continuation utility from an allocation at st: An allocation is
immune to bankruptcy if the household cannot increase its continuation utility by resorting
to bankruptcy at any node.










t) for all s
t: (8)
These participation constraints can be recast as solvency constraints. I choose solvency
constraints that only bind when the participation constraints bind, and hence they are not
too tight, in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000)2. These put a lower bound on the
value of the household's consumption claim.








¸ ¦st [f´g]; for all s
t 2 S
t;t ¸ 0: (9)
These solvency constraints keep net wealth non-negative in all states of the world. If
these constraints are satis¯ed in all states, households do not wish to exercise their option
to default3.
3.3 Risk Sharing
This section uses the solvency constraints to characterize the regions of the parameter space
where (no) risk sharing can be sustained.
2Zhang (1997) ¯rst endogenized borrowing constraints in a class of incomplete markets models.
3Detemple and Serrat (2003) consider an environment in which only a fraction of agents face these
constraints. They ¯nd small e®ects on risk premia.
10No Collateral The amount of collateralizable wealth plays a key role. When there is no
collateralizable wealth, the solvency constraints bind for all agents in all states of the world
and households are in autarky. If the constraint did not bind for one set of households with
positive measure, it would be have to be violated for another one with positive measure4.
Proposition 3.2. If there is no outside wealth (® = 0), then there can be no risk sharing in
equilibrium.
Perfect Risk Sharing When there is enough collateral, agents may be able to share risks
perfectly. Let ¦¤ denote the pricing functional de¯ned by the perfect insurance, Lucas-
Breeden SDF.
Proposition 3.3. If the value of the aggregate endowment exceeds the value of the private
endowment at all nodes, perfect risk sharing is feasible:
¦
¤
st [feg] ¸ ¦
¤
st [f´g] for all s
t:
If there is su±cient collateralizable wealth, then the solvency constraint is satis¯ed for
each (y;z) at perfect-insurance (Breeden-Lucas) prices, and perfect risk sharing is attainable.
Each household can sell a security that replicates its labor income and buy an equivalent
claim to the aggregate dividends stream that fully hedges the household.
Permanent Exclusion How does this relate to the Kehoe-Levine-Kocherlakota setup with
permanent exclusion? The solvency constraints are tighter in the case of bankruptcy than
under permanent exclusion, simply because one could always default and replicate autarky
in the economy with bankruptcy by eating one's endowment forever after. The reverse is
clearly not true. Let U(f´g)(st) denote the continuation utility from autarky.
Proposition 3.4. In the economy with permanent exclusion, the participation constraints
can be written as solvency constraints as follows:
¦st [fcg] ¸ ¦st [f´g] ¸ B
aut
st [f´g];
where U(f´g)(st) = supfc0gU(c0)(st) s.t. ¦st [fc0g] · Baut
st [f´g] and s.t. the participation
constraint is satis¯ed at all future nodes :
Because this inequality holds for any pricing functional, if perfect risk sharing is feasible
in the economy with bankruptcy, it is feasible in the economy with permanent exclusion.
4Krueger and Uhlig (2005) derive a similar result in an environment with one-sided commitment, on the
part of ¯nancial intermediaries.
11Loosely speaking, the Pareto frontier shifts down as one moves from permanent exclusion to
bankruptcy.
3.4 Kehoe-Levine Equilibrium
This section sets up the household's problem and de¯nes an equilibrium, when all trading
occurs at time zero. Taking prices fpt(stjs0)g as given, the household purchases history-
contingent consumption claims subject to a standard budget constraint and a sequence of


































¸ ¦st [f´g]; for all s
t 2 S
t;t ¸ 0:
The solvency constraints keep the households from defaulting. The following de¯nition
of equilibrium is in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine (1993) and in particular Krueger (1999).
De¯nition 3.2. For given initial state z0 and for given distribution £0; an equilibrium
consists of prices fpt(stjs0)g and allocations fct(µ0;st)g such that
² for given prices fpt(stjs0)g; the allocations solve the household's problem PP (except
possibly on a set of measure zero),







tjy0)d£0 = et(zt): (10)
In equilibrium households solve their optimization problem subject to the participation
constraints and the markets clear. I assume that the endowments are ¯nitely valued in
equilibrium.
Condition 3.1. Interest rates are high enough:
¦s0 [f´g] < 1 for all y0 and ¦z0 [feg] < 1: (11)
12When interest rates are high enough, the economy with sequential trading is equivalent
to an economy in which all trading occurs at time zero subject to these solvency constraints.
In the case of a continuum of consumers, it is not su±cient to restrict the value of the
aggregate endowment to be ¯nite (as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). It is also necessary
to restrict the value of labor income to be ¯nite. If the value of the aggregate endowment is
¯nite, then all µ0 will be ¯nite as well, since these are claims to the aggregate endowment.
From the time 0 budget constraint, I know that ¦s0 [fc(¹0;st)g] < 1: This means I can
apply Proposition 4.6 in Alvarez and Jermann (2000)5.
The next subsection makes use of Pareto-Negishi weights as a device for characterizing
equilibrium allocations and prices. These weights encode the wealth distribution dynamics
that are central to my results. I do not solve a planner's resource allocation problem, but I
characterize equilibrium allocations and prices from the household's ¯rst order conditions.
3.5 Stochastic Pareto-Negishi Weights
These solvency constraints introduce a stochastic element in the consumption share of each
household. The household's wealth at time 0, µ0; determines its initial Pareto-Negishi weight
¹0: This weight ¹0 governs the share of aggregate consumption allocated to this household
in all future states of the world st: ©0 is the joint measure over initial states and multipliers























0 d©0 guarantees market clearing after each aggregate
history.
In the presence of solvency constraints, the Pareto-Negishi weights are no longer ¯xed. I
use ³t(¹0;st) to denote the weight of a household with initial weight ¹0 in state st: f³t(¹0;st)g
is a non-decreasing stochastic process. These weights are constant, unless the household
switches to a state with a binding solvency constraint. In these instances the weight increases
such that the solvency constraint in (7) is satis¯ed with equality. Typically, these are states
with high labor income realizations. These weights record the sum of all solvency constraint
5This proposition demonstrates the equivalence between the Arrow-Debreu economy and the economy












which is automatically satis¯ed for power utility.
13multipliers in history st.
























The average weight process fht(zt)g is a non-decreasing (over time) stochastic process that
is adapted to the aggregate history zt. This process experiences a high growth rate when
a large fraction of agents ¯nd themselves switching to states with binding constraints -I
call this a liquidity shock. fht(zt)g can be interpreted as the aggregate shadow cost of the
solvency constraints. I will refer to this simply as the average weight process.
To derive this consumption sharing rule, I relabel households with initial promised utilities
w0 instead of initial wealth µ0. The dual program consists of minimizing the resources spent































¸ ¦st [f´g]; for all s
t 2 S
t;t ¸ 0: (15)
The convexity of the constraint set implies that the minimizer of DP and the maxi-
mizer of PP (the primal problem) coincide for initial wealth µ0 = C¤(w0;s0) ¡ ¦s0 [f´g](see
Luenberger (1969), p. 201).
To solve for the equilibrium allocations, I make the dual problem recursive. To do so, I
borrow and extend some tools recently developed to solve recursive contracting problems by
Marcet and Marimon (1999). Let mt(stjs0) = pt(stjs0)=¼t(stjs0), i.e. the state price de°ator
for payo®s conditional on event history st: ¿t(st) is the multiplier on the solvency constraint
at node st: I can transform the original dual program into a recursive saddle point problem




t); Â0 = 1: (16)
14Let ¹0 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the initial promised utility constraint in (14).
I will use these to index the households with, instead of promised utilities. It is the initial
value of the household's Pareto-Negishi weights. After history st; the Pareto-Negishi weight
is given by ³t(¹0;st) = ¹0=Ât(¹0;st): If a constraint binds (¿t(st) > 0), the weight ³ goes up,
if not, it stays the same. These weight adjustments prevent the value of the consumption
claim from dropping below the value of the labor income claim at any node.
Formally, I can transform the original dual program into a recursive saddle point problem
















where Ât(st) = Ât¡1(st¡1) ¡ ¿t(st);Â0 = 1: Then the recursive dual saddle point problem














Let ¹0 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the promise keeping constraint. The next step
is to use those Pareto-Negishi weights and exploit the homogeneity of the utility function
to construct a linear consumption sharing rule, as in the benchmark model. This allows me
to recover allocations and prices from the equilibrium sequence of multipliers f³t(¹0;st)g: I
will proceed in two steps.
First, consider 2 households having experienced the same history st. We know from the
¯rst order conditions of the recursive dual saddle point problem for two di®erent households
(¹0
0;y0) and (¹00













If the constraints never bind, ³t = ¹0 at all nodes and the condition in (18) reduces to
condition that characterizes perfect risk sharing. Second, the resource constraint implies









15(18) and (19) completely characterize the equilibrium consumption allocation for a given














This rule satis¯es the condition on the ratio of marginal utilities (18) and it clears the market
in each aggregate history zt: This can be veri¯ed by taking cross-sectional averages of the
individual consumption rule.
Cuto® Rule I derive a simple characterization of the optimal weight policy and then I
show that these weights fully characterize an equilibrium. The optimal policy rule has a
simple recursive structure. Let C (¹0;st;³) denote the continuation cost of a consumption








where consumption at each node is given by the risk sharing rule in (20). The optimal
weight updating rule has a simple structure. I will let lt(y;zt) denote the weight such that
a household starting with that weight has a continuation cost that exactly equals the price






= ¦st [f´g] with ³t(¹0;s
t) = lt(y;z
t):
A household compares its weight ³t¡1(¹0;st¡1) going into period t at node st to its cuto®
weight and adjusts its weight only if it is lower than the cuto®.
Lemma 3.1. The optimal weight updating policy consists of a cuto® rule flt(y;zt)g where










The following theorem explains that an equilibrium is fully characterized by these Pareto-
Negishi weight processes.
Theorem 3.1. An allocation f³t(¹0;st)g for all (¹0;st); state price de°ators fQt(zt)g and
forecasts fht(ztjz0)g de¯ne an equilibrium if (i) f³t(¹0;st)g
1
t=0 solves (DP) and (ii) the market























Properties of the Cuto® Rule These cuto® rules have two key properties that will prove
useful for understanding the consumption and wealth dynamics inside the model, and for
solving the model. First, the cuto® rules for the consumption shares are weakly lower than
the endowment share. The intuition is simple: the agent consumes less today in exchange
for the promise of higher consumption tomorrow.





· b ´(y;z) for all (z
t;y) (21)
Of course, as the collateralizable share of income decreases, the cuto® consumption shares
approach the labor endowment shares; when ® = 0, equation (21) holds with equality at all
nodes. Second, if the transition matrix satis¯es monotonicity, the cuto®s can be ranked and
the consumption share in the lowest income state equals the labor endowment share.











ht(zt) = b ´(y1;z) for all zt:
What are the implications for household consumption? Suppose perfect risk sharing
cannot be sustained, and h >> 1. Naturally, a wealthy household that starts o® with an
initial weight above the highest cuto® will end up hitting that bound in ¯nite time, unless
there is perfect risk sharing. This random stopping time is de¯ned as:
¿ = inf
½





The less risk sharing, the smaller ¿ in expectation for a given ¹0. I will assume this
economy has been running long enough such that the agents with weights higher than the








tjy0)d©0 = 0 for all z
t:
After some ¯nite ¿; all of the consumption shares $(¹0;st) are °uctuating between the
highest and the lowest endowment shares
b ´(y1;z) · $(¹0;s
t) < b ´(y1;z) for all (¹0;s
t) and t ¸ ¿ (22)
This follows directly Lemma (3.3) and (3.2). All households face at least one binding solvency
constraint, in the highest state y tomorrow. In this environment, wealthy agents simply run
down their wealth, until they reach the region of binding solvency constraints. The risk
sharing rule implies that, as long as agents do not switch to a state with a binding solvency
constraint, their consumption share drifts downward. So, if an agent were to start o® with
a lot of ¯nancial wealth at time 0, her consumption share $(¹0;st) would keep drifting
down until she reaches the region in which the solvency constraints start to bind. This
is the signature of complete markets: there is no motive for unconstrained households to
accumulate wealth. The rate of decrease is driven by the growth rate of fht(zt)g and this
growth rate is governed by the wealth distribution dynamics: Wealthy households chose
to run down their assets because interest rates are low. It would be ine±cient to have
some households hold too much ¯nancial wealth when collateral is scarce. As a result, in a
stationary equilibrium, all households face at least one binding solvency constraint, the one
for the highest income share tomorrow, because their consumption share is -weakly- smaller
than !(yn;zt):
This explains how this model reconciles fairly smooth individual consumption processes
with highly volatile SDF's. This also points to a crucial distinction between this model and
standard incomplete market models. In these models, wealthy agents do not run down their
¯nancial wealth holdings, and as a result, may not face any binding solvency constraints
at all. In some sense, the stock of scarce collateral is not being used as e±ciently in those
equilibria. The next subsection derives an expression for the SDF.
3.6 Risk Premia
The structure of the SDF is very revealing. The ¯rst part is the Breeden-Lucas SDF that
emerges in a representative agent economy. The second part is the multiplicative adjustment
of the SDF that summarizes the shocks to the wealth distribution induced by the solvency
18constraints; it is the liquidity shock, raised to the power °.










In each aggregate state zt+1 payo®s are priced o® the IMRS of unconstrained agents,
whose Pareto-Negishi weight did not change between t and t + 1. The risk sharing rule for
consumption directly implies that his or her IMRS equals the SDF expression in equation
(23).
Bounds The theory puts upper and lower bounds on the size of these liquidity shocks that
depend only on the primitives of this economy. In the perfect insurance equilibrium, the
average weights do not grow. In the autarchic equilibrium, the weights grow at a rate that
equals the ratio of the largest and the smallest endowment shares.













When all households are constrained, the SDF equals the autarchic IMRS of the household
switching from the highest to the lowest income state. When none of the households are
constrained, their Pareto-Negishi weights are constant. In equilibrium, these liquidity shocks
will vary between these bounds depending on the history of aggregate shocks.
Why are these liquidity shocks? If g = 1, then the economy sustains the maximum
amount of trading, to implement complete risk insurance. The aggregate volume of trade in
node zt is measured by the average (across households) distance between the consumption













This is a direct measure of how far the allocations are from autarchy. The trading volume in
¯nancial markets peaks when perfect insurance is implemented. On the other hand, when
g hits the upper bound, the trading volume reaches the absolute minimum (zero). So, g is
a perfect liquidity indicator. The size of these liquidity shocks is governed by the mass of
households in the left tail of the wealth distribution, as explained in the next subsection.
19Liquidity Shocks and the Wealth Distribution I use consumption weights as station-
ary state variables to replace the Pareto-Negishi weights. gt(zt) denotes the growth rate of






and I store this as the household's state variable. ©zt denotes the joint measure over (y;!)
in state zt: These consumption shares integrate to one by construction, and they evolve
according to a simple cuto® rule. If the share of a household going into a period is larger




























0jy)d©zt¡1 (dy £ d!): (27)




'(y0jy)!d©zt¡1 (dy £ d!) = 1 by con-
struction. The size of the liquidity shock is determined by the mass of households in the
left tail. In general, the size of these shocks depends on the entire aggregate history zt6.
However, if labor income risk is independent of the aggregate shocks, these liquidity shocks
are constant. We start by considering this simple case.
Benchmark: Independent Labor Income risk
Condition 3.2. The labor income shocks are independent of the aggregate shocks if b ´(yt;zt) =
b ´(yt)
In this case, it is easy to show that the cuto® weight !(y0) does not depend on the
aggregate history, simply because the price of a claim to labor income relative to the level of
the aggregate endowment, ¦st [f´g]=et(zt), does not depend on zt. Hence, neither does the
cuto® weight !(y0). As a result, after the transitional dynamics have dissipated, the liquidity
shock is constant and so is the joint distribution of consumption weights and endowments.
6This creates a computational problem that I deal with in section 5.
20Proposition 3.6. : If aggregate uncertainty is i.i.d. and labor income risk is independent















0jy)d©(dy £ d!) (29)
The mass of households in the left tail is constant over time.









The second part, g°, is constant in the case of independent labor income risk. As a result,
the liquidity constraints push up the price of consumption in all states tomorrow. This
lowers the risk-free rate, but it does not change risk premia relative to the full insurance
benchmark. Next, I relax this independence assumption, and I look at a calibrated version
of the model.
4 Results
This sections starts by explaining the calibration, then we discuss the dynamics of the liquid-
ity shocks and their connection to the wealth distribution and the dynamics of consumption.
Finally, I conclude by discussing the asset pricing implications.
4.1 Calibration
We choose a ° of seven and a time discount factor ¯ of .95. These preference parameters
allow us to match the collaterizable wealth to income ratio in the data when the collaterizable
income share ® is 7.5%, as discussed below.
Collateralizable Wealth The average ratio of collateralizable wealth to aggregate income
in the US is 3.87 between 1950 and 2005. The wealth measure includes the value of the non-
¯nancial corporate sector and the value of residential wealth (Flow of Funds). We exclude
government debt. Aggregate income includes tradeable income (payouts to securities owners
21of the non-¯nancial, corporate sector, and rental income) and non-tradeable income (labor
income and proprietary income). The collaterizable wealth to income ratio is 3.87 in the
post-war US data. Tradeable or collateralizable income is 8.3% of total income. In the
model, we choose ® equal to 7.5 % to match the collaterizable wealth to income ratio of 3.87
in the data7. The details are in the appendix in section B. The collateralizable wealth share
governs the average size of the liquidity shocks, while the labor income dynamics control the
time-variation in the size of these shocks.
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Endowment Risk The Markov process for log´(y;z)
is taken from Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2006) (see page 28). We use a 4-state dis-
cretization. The conditional variance in recessions and booms is 0.181 and 0.037, and the
autocorrelation is 0.89. The elements of the process log´ are f¡2:385;0:646g in low aggre-
gate consumption growth states and f¡0:904;0:467g in high aggregate consumption growth
states. Labor income risk doubles in low aggregate consumption growth states. Aggregate
consumption growth ¸(zt) is i.i.d. This ensures all the dynamics in risk premia °ow from the
liquidity shocks. The moments for aggregate consumption growth are taken from Mehra and
Prescott (1985). The average consumption growth rate is 1.8 %. The standard deviation
is 3.15 %. Recessions are less frequent: 27% of realizations are low aggregate consumption
growth states. Finally, section 5 explains the computational procedure in detail.
4.2 Liquidity Shocks
While the aggregate consumption growth shocks are i.i.d., the wealth dynamics induced by
these shocks are not, as is clear from ¯gure 1. In this calibrated version of the model, the
liquidity shocks vary a lot in size depending on the history of aggregate consumption growth
shocks.
In this calibrated version of the model, liquidity shocks are larger in low aggregate con-
sumption growth states, because the increase in the cross-sectional variation of idiosyncratic
income shocks raises the cuto® values !(y0;zt), as is clear from inspecting the expression for
g in equation (27). In the bottom panel of ¯gure 1, we also plot the trade volume (de¯ned
in equation (24)). Large liquidity shocks coincide with equally large drops in trade volume.
When these large shocks occur, the fraction of constrained agents increases to forty-¯ve
percent, compared to 10 percent in high aggregate consumption growth states.
History of Aggregate Consumption Growth Shocks The model also produces history
dependence in these liquidity shocks. Figure 2 plots the liquidity shocks and the moments of
7The ratio is 3.79 in the model's benchmark calibration.
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Wealth. The ¯gure plots the liquidity shocks and the centered moments of






. The shaded areas are low aggregate consumption growth states. ° is 7, ® is 7.5% and
¯ is .95.
the wealth distribution; we keep the same draw of aggregate shocks as in ¯gure 1. `Household









I divide by the level of the aggregate endowment, to render it stationary. During a long series
of high aggregate consumption growth realizations (say between period 83 and 93 in ¯gure
2), there is a build-up of low wealth households in the left tail of the wealth distribution.
The standard deviation of the wealth distribution increases. Mechanically, this means the






0jy)d©zt¡1 (dy £ d!) (31)
23These households have been running down their asset levels as long as they are in low
idiosyncratic income states. Their Pareto-Negishi weights remain unchanged throughout,
and as a result, their consumption shares were drifting downwards. When a low aggregate
consumption growth state is realized, a larger fraction of households draws a high income
state with a high cuto® value !(y0;zt). This translates into a large liquidity shock as their
consumption shares jump up from very low levels (see the de¯nition of the liquidity shock
in eq. 27). The left tail of the wealth distribution is eliminated, and the standard deviation
of the wealth distribution drops and so does the skewness and the kurtosis.
4.3 Consumption Dynamics
Risk Sharing This calibrated version of the collateral economy sustains a lot of risk shar-
ing. In the benchmark calibration the standard deviation of consumption share growth for
households is 7.5 percent, less than twice the standard deviation of aggregate consumption
growth, while the standard deviation of endowment share growth is thirty-three percent.
Not all agents in states with binding solvency constraints experience large shocks to their
consumption shares. In the history with the largest liquidity shock, forty-nine percent expe-
rience a four percent consumption share drop, thirty-six percent experience an eight percent
increase and six percent experience an eleven percent increase. In the history with the small-
est liquidity shock (after consecutive low aggregate consumption growth shocks) almost all
households have roughly constant consumption shares.
The left panel of ¯gure 3 plots the consumption share as a fraction of the average endow-
ment of a single household against its labor income share. The consumption shares °uctuate
between the highest and the lowest income shares. This is what I showed in equation (22).
In low income states, the household's consumption share decreases as the household runs
down its assets. The largest consumption share increases occur when the household switches
from the low state to the high state after a large string of adverse idiosyncratic shocks. In
the favorable income states, its consumption share increases somewhat when it switches to
the highest states. These consumption share increases are larger in recessions and produce
large liquidity shocks when aggregated across consumers. Recessions are periods when the
aggregate show cost of the solvency constraint increases.
The right panel of ¯gure 3 plots the net wealth (net of human wealth) scaled by the
aggregate endowment for the same history of shocks. Each time the household switches to
a state with a binding solvency constraint, its net wealth position hits zero. Net wealth is
obviously much more volatile than the consumption. The household's portfolio realizes high



















Figure 3: Solvency Constraints In the left panel, the full line is the consumption share of a household plotted
against the labor income share (dotted line) over a period of 300 years. The y-axis on the left hand side shows the consumption
shares; on the right hand side is the labor income share. In the right panel, the full line is net wealth of a household scaled by
its aggregate endowment, plotted against its labor endowment share (dotted line) over a period of 55 years. The y-axis on the
left hand side shows the endowment shares; on the right hand side is net wealth. ° is 7, ® is 7.5% and ¯ is .95.
but the hedge is incomplete because of the collateral constraints. To illustrate the di®erence,
¯gure 4 plots the consumption share and the wealth of a household not facing any solvency
constraints, for the same history of shocks. This household is perfectly hedged, and net
wealth is negative in the high y states.
4.4 Asset Pricing Results
The liquidity risk induced by the wealth distribution shocks interacts with aggregate con-
sumption growth risk to modify the SDF's properties in the right direction to match the
dynamics of equity and bond risk premia.
Dividend Process Following Bansal and Yaron (2004), dividend growth is a function of
aggregate consumption growth and the change in the dividend/consumption ratio qt:
¢dt+1 = ± + Á¢ct+1 + ¢qt+1 (32)
qt+1 = ½qqt + 'd¾ut+1
u is white noise with mean zero and variance 1. ¾ is the standard deviation of aggregate



















Figure 4: No Solvency Constraints In the left panel, the full line is the consumption share of a household plotted
against the labor income share (dotted line) over a period of 300 years. The y-axis on the left hand side shows the consumption
shares; on the right hand side is the labor income share. In the right panel, the full line is net wealth of a household scaled by
its aggregate endowment, plotted against its labor endowment share (dotted line) over a period of 55 years. The y-axis on the
left hand side shows the endowment shares; on the right hand side is net wealth. ° is 7, ® is 7.5% and ¯ is .95.
relation of the consumption/dividend ratio, the leverage parameter Á in the dividend growth
process is set to 3 , and 'd = 4:5. Equity is a claim to this dividend process.
My benchmark calibration sets the time discount factor ¯ equal to .95 and ° to 7. Table
1 compares the moments of the data, the representative agent model and the collateral
model. The excess return on equity is denoted Re; while Rc;e denotes the excess return on
a non-levered claim to the aggregate endowment process. The asset pricing statistics were
generated by drawing 10.000 realizations from the model, simulated with 5000 agents.
Representative agent The benchmark perfect insurance economy produces a risk-free
rate of thirteen percent and an equity premium of 2.8 percent, one percent for the non-
levered claim to consumption. This is the risk-free rate and the equity premium puzzle. In
addition, the model produces a constant conditional market price of risk (second column of
Table 1).
Collateral economy In the collateral model, the maximum Sharpe Ratio is .43. The
liquidity risk induced by the solvency constraints delivers a low risk-free rate of 19 basis
points and a high equity premium of 6.63 percentage points. The compensation per unit of
risk is large as well; the Sharpe ratio on the non-levered claim is around 39 percent, compared
to 38 percent in the data. The standard deviation of the conditional market price of risk in
26Table 1: Benchmark Calibration Results.
Re is the return on a leveraged dividend claim; Rc;e is the excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The ¯rst panel
shows moments for the data, the second panel for the representative agent model and the third panel for the collateral model.
These moments were generated by averaging 10.000 draws from an economy with 5000 agents. ® is 7.5 percent, ° is 7 and ¯
is .95. The CRSP-VW index was used to compute the market return, while the Fama-Bliss risk-free rate was used to compute









data 7:08 20:0 0:382 0:96 4:80
rep 0:279 0 2:88 13:18 0:218 1:06 4:10 0:260 15:03 0
coll 0:433 0:07 6:63 16:78 0:394 4:18 10:55 0:397 0:193 5:31
the collateral model (second column of Table 1) is 7 percent. Finally, the model overstates
the volatility of the risk-free rate relative to the data.
To understand these results, we need to understand the e®ect of these liquidity shocks.
First, the liquidity shocks increase the demand for insurance and lower the risk-free rate. This
is obvious from the SDF in (30), because gt > 1. The solvency constraints keep the agents
from borrowing against their future labor income and the liquidity risk also induces them
to save more as a precautionary device. Second, the liquidity shocks increase the volatility
of the SDF because the shocks are negatively correlated with the aggregate consumption
growth process. This pattern emerges in equilibrium when a larger fraction of agents is
constrained in states with low aggregate consumption growth realization, as is the case in
this calibrated version of the economy (see subsection 4.2 ).
Liquidity Premium The increased volatility raises risk premia because returns are low
in the low aggregate consumption growth states, when the liquidity shocks are large. I use
Ri to denote the return on some risky security. Under joint lognormality of ¢log(et+1=ht+1)
and log(Ri










The ¯rst part is the standard compensation for consumption growth risk. The second part
is the compensation for liquidity risk. This liquidity part accounts for over two thirds of the
equity premium in my benchmark calibration8.
Figure 1 plots liquidity shocks and trading volume for the same sequence of aggregate
8In the data, this liquidity premium is large. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) ¯nd that the average return
on stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5 % annually.
27shocks. These shocks coincide with large negative innovations to trading volume. As is
clear from ¯gure 1, since trading volume or liquidity co-moves with all other returns, it also
predicts future excess returns in the collateral model. This is consistent with the evidence
from the data (see for example Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)).
Bonds The same mechanism increases risk premia on bonds of longer maturity. Since the
aggregate shocks are i.i.d., the representative agent model produces a °at yield curve, but
the collateral model produces an upward sloping yield curve on average. Let pN
t denote the
log of the price of a N-year zero coupon bond. The yield yN
t = ¡pN
t =N increases from zero





t¡1 (in logs) on a 2-year zero






increases as N increases, because the liquidity shocks trigger a persistent, subsequent increase
in the short rate, in°icting larger losses on holders of longer maturity bonds. As a result,
these zero coupon bond holding period returns become more sensitive to liquidity shocks as
the maturity increases.
Time Variation in Risk Premia Recall that, in the representative agent economy, the
conditional Sharpe ratio, the conditional risk premium, the conditional volatility, the risk-
free rate, the slope of the yield curve and the trading volume are all constant over time,
because the aggregate shocks are i.i.d. The collateral model's liquidity shocks generate time
varying risk premia.
Figure 5 plots some key asset pricing statistics that illustrate the time variation in risk
premia. The ¯rst plot shows the liquidity shocks, while the second plot shows the conditional
Sharpe ratio on equity, which varies from .3 , after a recession, to .55, after a long series of
high aggregate consumption growth shocks. The conditional risk premium on equity (third
plot) varies between 5 and 10 percent. After a long series of high aggregate consumption
growth realizations, the risk-free rate (¯fth plot) drops and the conditional market price
of risk increases. The low risk-free rate predicts high excess returns on equity, because it
signals large liquidity shocks are likely to occur. This re°ects the build-up of households in
the left tail of the wealth distribution. At the same time, the conditional volatility of equity
returns (fourth plot) increases as well. The slope of the yield curve increases in anticipation
of a large liquidity shock, and this partly re°ects an increase in the risk premium. After
the recession, the conditional market price of risk drops to its lowest level, and the risk-free
rate increases sharply, while the yield curve °attens. Interestingly, the negative correlation
28between the conditional market price of risk and the riskfree rate is a su±cient condition to
explain the forward premium puzzle (Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)).
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Figure 5: Liquidity Shocks, Market Price of Risk and Aggregate Consumption
Growth The shaded area indicates low aggregate consumption growth states. The upper panel plots the liquidity shocks
(left) and the conditional Sharpe ratio on equity (right). The middle panel plots the conditional expected excess return on
equity (left) and the conditional standard deviation (right). The lower panel plots the risk-free rate (left) and the slope of the
yield curve (right). The slope of the yield curve is y10
t ¡ y1
t. ¯ is .95, ° is 7, and ® is 7.5%.
Summary What is critical for these result? I list three ingredients: (i) scarcity of collat-
eral, (ii) state-contingent nature of the constraints, and (iii) large number of agents.
² The quantity of collateral: The quantity of collateral was calibrated to match ratio of
collateralizable wealth to total income of 3.8 in US data. The collateralizable income
faction ® is 7.5 %, compared to 8.3 % in the data. This calibrated version of the
collateral economy also matches the equity premium and the risk-free rate. If ® is set
equal to 10 %, the risk-free rate increases to 1.28 % and the equity premium drops to
6.41 %. When ® is 15 %, the equity premium drops ro 5.7 % and the risk-free rate
increases to 3.91 %. Finally, when ® is 30 percent, the collateral economy is identical
to the representative agent economy; the solvency constraints no longer bind.
² The state-contingent nature of the collateral constraints, not the tightness of the con-
straints. In the same environment, an \exogenous" constraint on the value of the net
29wealth today contributes a factor to the Lucas-Breeden SDF that does not depend on
the aggregate shock in the next period; the aggregate cost of this type of constraint
raises the market price of consumption by the same amount in all states of the world
tomorrow (see Luttmer (1991)). This factor only lowers the risk-free rate, but does
not a®ect risk premia.
² Large number of agents: In the same economy with two agents and i.i.d. aggregate
shocks, risk premia are essentially constant over time.
The last section explains the computational procedure in detail.
5 Approximation
A household's Pareto-Negishi weight summarizes its history of private shocks, but obviously
not the history of aggregate shocks. In fact, the liquidity shocks depend on the entire
history of aggregate shocks. To compute equilibrium prices and allocations, I keep track of
only a truncated version of the aggregate history. This approach is motivated by the limited
memory of these economies, if there is su±cient growth in the aggregate weight process.
This is borne out by the computations. Using these consumption weights, I construct an
approximate equilibrium in which agents use only the last k aggregate shocks to forecast g.
Stationary approximating equilibrium. In a stationary equilibrium, there is no prob-
ability mass on weights above the highest reservation level. Let L denote the domain for the
consumption weights !: l(!;y0;z0;zk) : L £ Y £ Z £ Zk ! R; one for each (y0;z0) 2 Y £ Z,
gives the new consumption weight for a household entering the period with weight !; having








where g¤(z0;zk) is the forecast of the liquidity shock. This consumption share will be stored
as the new state variable for this household at the end of the period. The reservation
weight policy function !(y0;z0;zk) : Z £Zk ! R and the average weight forecasting function












30The reservation weights are determined such that the solvency constraints bind exactly.





record the price in units of today's
consumption of claim to the consumption stream and the labor income stream respectively,
scaled by the aggregate endowment today, to keep them stationary. The reservation weights
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for each pair (z0;zk): E denotes the expectation operator over all possible histories z1 con-
sistent with zk: The actual measure ©z1 depends -possibly- on the entire history of shocks










Households do not make Euler equation errors, but the markets do not clear exactly. That
is the sense in which this equilibrium is approximate. The percentage allocation error is
simply the percentage forecast error:
g(z0;z1)¡g(z0;zk)
g(z0;zk) : These will turn out to be very small.
As k ! 1; the errors tend to zero.









and g(z0;zk) such that (i) g(z0;zk)
equals the average liquidity shock in zk and (ii) l
¡
!;y0;z0;zk¢
satis¯es the optimal policy
rule.
The optimal household consumption policy functions and equilibrium prices are embed-
ded in this information through the risk sharing rule and the expression for the SDF.
Computational Algorithm The algorithm iterates on liquidity shock forecasts:












and the policy function l1
¡
!;y0;z0;zk¢
: To do so, I simply determine the cuto® level at










² Next, I simulate a T-period aggregate history fztg
1
t=0 for a cross-section of N agents.
I use T = 10:000 and N = 5000. For each
¡
zk;z0¢
; I compute the average growth rate
b ga
1(zk;z0) implied by the policy function: This provides a new guess b g2(zk;z0) for the
weight growth functions.





b g¤(zk;z0). The policy functions and the average weight growth functions character-
ize a stationary, stochastic equilibrium. The household Euler equations are satis¯ed
























, I use a Tchebychev polynomial approximation in the consumption
weight ! (Judd (1998)). The polynomial is of order 7 and I use 30 nodes. The approximation
works well. The mean of the allocation errors is close to .05 percent for all computations,
while the standard deviation is roughly the same size. The low standard deviation of the
errors indicates that the errors are tightly distributed around zero. The sup norm is around
2 percent.
6 Conclusion
There is a growing literature that tries to explain the empirical evidence on liquidity risk
(see e.g. Acharya and Pedersen (2005). My paper shows there is a tight connection between
the aggregate volume of trade in securities markets and risk premia in a model with solvency
constraints as the only trading friction. The liquidity risk produces a low risk-free rate, a
large equity premium, an upward sloping yield curve and substantial time variation in risk
premia in a model with i.i.d. aggregate consumption growth innovations and standard power
9This algorithm can be shown to converge as k ! 1: The proof is available upon request.
32utility preferences. In related work, Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2006) introduce housing
into a version of my model and they show the housing collateral dynamics help to match
lower frequency variation in risk premia, while Lustig and VanNieuwerburgh (2005) test the
empirical predictions of this housing collateral model.
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35A Proofs
² Proof of Proposition 3.1:




























and that the participation constraints bind only if the solvency constraints bind. This
follows directly from the de¯nition of ·t(st): If ¦st [fc(µ0;yt;zt)g] ¸ ¦st [f´g]; then













such that the budget constraint is satis¯ed ¦st [fc0g] · ¦st [fc(µ0;yt;zt)g] and such
that the solvency constraints are satis¯ed in all following histories:
U(c)(s
¿) ¸ ·¿(s
¿) for all s
¿ ¸ s
t:






such that the budget constraint is satis¯ed ¦st [fc0g] · ¦st [f´g] and the solvency
constraints are satis¯ed in all following histories: U(c)(s¿) ¸ ·¿(s¿) for all s¿ ¸ st:
This shows that the solvency constraints ensure that the participation constraints are
satis¯ed. In addition, the same argument implies that, if the solvency constraints
bind, then the participation constraints bind. The solvency constraint is not too tight.
Second, the participation constraints imply that the solvency constraints are satis¯ed.
If U(fc(µ0;yt;zt)g)(st) ¸ ·t(st), then from (35) and (36), it follows that ¦st [f´g] ·
¦st [fc(µ0;yt;zt)g]: The second part is obvious.
² Proof of Proposition 3.2:








tjy0)d©0 ¸ 0: (37)
Using p(stjs0) = Q(ztjz0)
¼(yt;ztjy0;z0)
















with (z¿;y¿) º st: To justify the interchange of limits and expectations, I appeal to
the monotone convergence theorem. Let ¦n
st [fc(¹0;yt;zt)g] be the value of the claim
to the consumption stream until t + n and let ¦n
st [f´g] be similarly de¯ned. Then
the monotone convergence theorem can be applied for both sequences because for all
n : 0 · Xn · Xn+1: Let X = limn Xn: Then EXn % X as n ! 1 (where EX is
possibly in¯nite). This justi¯es the interchange of limit and the expectation (SLP,
1989, p.187).
The Law of Large Numbers and the de¯nition of the labor share of the aggregate







¼zt(yt)b ´t(yt;zt) = (1 ¡ ®); (39)











Plugging eqs. (39) and (40) back into eq. (38) implies the following inequality must
hold at all nodes zt: ®¦zt [fet(zt)g] ¸ 0: If there is no outside wealth (® = 0) in the
economy, then the expression is zero at all nodes zt and eq. (37) holds with equality
at all nodes zt: This implies that each individual constraint binds for all st and there
can be no risk sharing. Why? Suppose there are some households (¹0;yt;zt) 2 A at





and their constraint is slack: ¦st [fc(¹0;yt;zt)g] > ¦st [f´g]: Given that eq. (37) holds
37with equality at all nodes zt with ® = 0; there are some households (¹0
0;yt;zt) at node




which have constraints that are violated: ¦st [fc(¹0
0;yt;zt)g] < ¦st [f´g]: If not, (37)
would be violated. But this violates the participation constraints for these agents. So,








= ¦st [f´g] for all y
t at z
t:
The same argument can be repeated for all zt: This implies that the following equality








= ¦st [f´g] for all s
t;
and there can be no risk sharing: c(¹0;yt;zt) = ´t(st) for all st and ¹0
² Proof of Proposition 3.3:
Proof. If this condition is satis¯ed: ¦¤
st [feg] ¸ ¦¤
st [f´g] for all st; where ¦¤
st is the
complete insurance pricing functional, then each household can get a constant and
equal share of the aggregate endowment at all future nodes. Perfect risk sharing is
possible.
² Proof of Proposition 3.4:
Proof. The value of the outside option at each node st is simply the value of autarky:
U(´)(st): The value of bankruptcy has to exceed the value of autarky for any pricing
functional, since continuation values are monotonic in wealth:




st [f´g];st;c) = U(f´g)(st):
² Proof of Lemma 3.1:












¡ ¦st [f´g]) = 0;
38and C (¹0;st;l) ¸ ¦st [f´g] for all st: The last inequality follows from the fact that
C(¢) is non-decreasing in ¹0: It is easy to verify that there exist no other weight policy
rules that satisfy these necessary conditions. Since the optimal policy is to compare
the current weight ³ to the cuto® rule lt(y;zt); the continuation cost can be stated
as a function of the current weight, the current idiosyncratic state and the aggregate
history: C (¹0;st;l) = Ct(³;y;zt):
The household's policy rule f³t(¹0;st)g can be written recursively as flt(l;y;zt)g where
l0 = ¹0 and lt(lt¡1;y;zt) = lt¡1 if lt¡1 > lt(y;zt) and lt(lt¡1;y;zt) = lt(y;zt) elsewhere:
The reason is simple. If the constraint does not bind, the weight is left unchanged. If
it does bind, it is set to its cuto® value.
² Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Proof. f³t(¹0;st)g
1










The sequence of Lagrangian multipliers f³t(¹0;st) ¡ ³t¡1(¹0;st¡1)g satisfy the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for a saddle point. The consumption allocations satisfy the ¯rst
order conditions for optimality (see derivation of risk sharing rule ). Market clearing






= ht(zt) implies that E [ct(¹0;yt;zt)] = et(zt):
Now, let µ0 = C(¹0;s0;l)¡¦s0 [f´g]: The prices implied by fmt(ztjz0)g are equilibrium
prices by construction and rule out arbitrage opportunities. So, now I can relabel the
households as (µ0(¹0);s0) and I have recovered the equilibrium allocations fct(µ0;st)g
and the prices fpt(stjs0)g .
² Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof. First, I will transform this growth economy into a stationary economy with
stochastic discount rates (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)) . The aggregate growth rate












39where b c represents the consumption share of the total endowment and let the trans-
































denote the ex-dividend price-dividend ratio (i.e. the previous ex-
pression less today's dividend). The equilibrium consumption shares in the stationary
economy can simply be scaled up to obtain the allocations in the growth economy. The
prices of claims to a dividend stream in the stationary economy are the price-dividend
ratio's in the growth economy.

















b ¦zt+1;y0 [fb ´g]'(y
0jy);
where lt(¹0;st) = lt(zt;y): Now since, b C (¹0;st+1;l) ¸ b ¦zt+1;y0 [fb ´g] for all (yt+1;zt+1);




ht(zt) · b ´(y;z) for all (y;z):
² Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Proof. Since '(y0jy) satis¯ed monotonicity, I can rank the cuto® weights, because the
value of the endowment claims can be ranked such that:
b ¦zt;yn [fb ´g] ¸ b ¦zt;yn¡1 [fb ´g] ¸ ::: ¸ b ¦zt;y1 [fb ´g]; (43)
for all zt. To show this, I start with a truncated version of this economy at T ¡1 I use
e ¦ to denote the claims in the truncated version of this economy. By de¯nition, for all
zT¡1 :















40and verify that these objects can be ranked:
e ¦zT¡1;yn [fb ´g] ¸ e ¦zT¡1;yn¡1 [fb ´g] ¸ e ¦zT¡1;y1 [fb ´g];
because
P
y0 ´(y0;z0)'(y0jy) is non-decreasing in y: This follows immediately from the
de¯nition of monotonicity of '(y0jy). Next, I roll the truncated economy back one
more period:











e ¦zt+1;y0 [fb ´g]'(y
0jy);
and using the result for T ¡ 1, one obtains the following ranking:
e ¦zT¡2;yn [fb ´g] ¸ e ¦zT¡2;yn¡1 [fb ´g] ¸ ::: ¸ e ¦zT¡2;y1 [fb ´g]:
By backward induction, for any zt; the claims in the truncated economy can be ranked
such that:
e ¦zt;yn ¸ e ¦zt;yn¡1 ¸ ::: ¸ e ¦zt;y1:
Next, I note that the price of a claim in the in¯nite horizon economy can be stated as:







and that limT!1 e Et¯T¡t hT
ht
b ¦zT;yT is independent of yt and converges to some ¯nite x
that does not depend on yt : the transition matrix has no absorbing states, all states y0
will be visited in¯nitely often in the limit and the limit cannot depend on yt: The limit
is ¯nite by assumption. Hence, the results for the truncated economy are valid for the
in¯nite horizon economy. This shows equation (43) holds. Finally, I need to show that























Since b C is monotonically increasing in ³, I know that for all y0 and zt :
lt(z
t;yn) ¸ lt(z
t;yn¡1) ¸ ::: ¸ lt(z
t;y1):
This result, combined with Lemma 3.2, implies directly that the consumption share in
41the lowest state equals the endowment share:
lt(zt;y1)
ht(zt) = b ´(y1;zt) for all zt:(q.e.d.)
² Proof of Proposition 3.5:











To economize on notation, let ³t(¹0;st) = ¹0=Ât(¹0;st): Consider the ratio of ¯rst order












and substitute for the optimal risk sharing rule, noting that the unconstrained investor's














² Proof of Lemma 3.4:







































Second, I prove that the following inequality holds: ht+1(zt+1)=ht(zt) ·
b ´(yn;zt)
b ´(y1;zt+1): If















42which implies that the unconstrained agent is consuming less than her endowment at
zt and more than her endowment at zt+1; but that can be ruled out on the basis of
Lemma (3.2).
² Proof of Proposition 3.6:
Proof. In this case, in the transformed economy, the z shocks have disappeared alto-
gether, since b ´ does not depend on z. I will use ! to denote the consumption share
of an agent at the end of the previous period. Let b C(!;y) denote the cost of the
consumption stream for a household in state y: Similarly, I use b Cy(y) to denote the
cost of the labor endowment stream. Finally, l(!;y) denotes the policy rule for the
consumption weights. !0 = l(!;y0)=g is the new consumption share. The cuto® rule
l(y0) depends only on y, because the value of the labor income claim b C´(y) does not
depend on z. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, I assume that there exists a






I compute g¤: Second, I show that for given g¤;there exists a stationary distribution of
consumption weights !:
First, the cuto® rule l(y0) depends only on y because the value of the labor income
claim C´(y) does not depend on zt :







and neither does the value of the consumption claim C(!;y):
b C(!;y) = l(!;y
0)=g









where the next period 's weight is discounted: !0 = l(!;y0)=g:
The distribution is rescaled at the end of each period (after the cuto® rule is applied)
such that growth is eliminated from the consumption weights:
R
!©¤ (d! £ dy) = 1:
This is done simply by dividing all the weights by the growth rate g: The policy rules
induce the following growth rate for the average weight: g¤ =
R
l(!;y0)©¤ (d! £ dy):
This establishes the equivalence of the economy with i.i.d. aggregate uncertainty and
the one without aggregate uncertainty and a twisted transition probability matrix.
43Given the monotonicity assumptions I have imposed on ', I know that the consumption
weights ! live on a closed domain L because we know that the consumption shares




since g is bounded. If some agent starts with an initial weight !0 ¸ l their consumption
weight drops below l after a ¯nite number of steps unless there is perfect risk sharing.
Second, we establish the existence of a stationary equilibrium. Let B(L) the Borel
set of L and let P(Y ) be the power set of Y: The policy function l together with the
transition function ¼ jointly de¯ne a Markov transition function on income shocks and






if lh(!;y0)=h¤ 2 L: Next, de¯ne an operator on the space of probability measures





A ¯xed point of this operator is an invariant probability measure. Let ©¤ denote the
invariant measure over the space (L £ Y ) £ (B(L) £ P(Y )) that satis¯es invariance:
T
¤©
¤ (L;Y) = ©
¤:









I can de¯ne a stationary equilibrium. A stationary equilibrium consists of cost functions
C(!;y);Cy(y); shadow discounter Q; updating rules l(!;y) and an invariant measure
©¤ such that (i) the recursive updating rule is optimal: (l(!;y0) ¡ !) (C(!;y) ¡ C´(y)) =
0; (ii) the market clears: g¤ = E [l(!;y0)] and (iii) there is no arbitrage Q = g¤°;
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. ©¤; the stationary measure over (L £ Y ) £
(B(L) £ P(Y )) induced by T ¤:
It remains to be shown that this stationary measure exists. This section follows the
strategy by Krueger (1999) on p.15 applied to a similar problem. I de¯ne an operator





A ¯xed point of this operator is de¯ned to be an invariant probability measure. To show
there exists a unique ¯xed point of this operator, I check condition M in (Stokey, Lucas,
and Prescott (1989) p. 348). If this condition is satis¯ed, I can use Theorem 11.12 in
Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) p. 350. To be perfectly general, let L = [l;lmax]:
There has to be an " > 0 and an N ¸ 1 such that for all sets L;Y
Q
N ((!;y);(L;Y)) ¸ " and Q
N ((!;y);(L;Y)
c) ¸ " .
It is su±cient to show that there exists an " > 0 and an N ¸ 1 such that for all (!;y) 2
(L;Y )) : QN ((!;y);(lmax;yn)) ¸ "; but we know that Q((!;y);(lmax;yn)) ¸ '(ynjy):
If lmax ¸ l; then de¯ne
N = min
½





where N is ¯nite unless there is perfect risk sharing. Then we know that QN ((!;y);(lmax;yn)) ¸
" where
" = '(ynjy) ¤ ('(ynjyn))
N¡1 :
If l ¸ lmax; the proof is immediate by setting " = '(ynjy): This establishes the existence



















The computation of ¯rm value returns is based on Hall (2001). The data to construct our
measure of returns on ¯rm value were obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds 10. We use
the (seasonally not adjusted) °ow tables for the non-farm, non-¯nancial corporate sector,
in UTABS 102D. I calculate the value of all securities as the sum of ¯nancial liabilities
(144190005) plus the market value of equity (1031640030) less ¯nancial assets (144090005),
adjusted for the di®erence between market and book for bonds. I correct for changes in the
10at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ RELEASES/z1/current/data.htm
45market value of outstanding bonds by applying the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index to the
level of outstanding corporate bonds at the end of the previous year.
The °ow of pay-outs to securities holders is measured as dividends (10612005) plus the
interest paid on debt (from the NIPA Table on Gross Product of non-¯nancial, corporate
business) less the increase in net ¯nancial liabilities (10419005), which includes issues of
equity (103164003). I obtain compensation of all employees (line 2,Table 1.12) , propri-
etary's income (line 9, Table 1.12) and rental income (NIPA line 12 Table 1.12) from NIPA.
Finally, I obtain the value of residential housing wealth from the Flow of Funds Tables
(FoF-FL155035015.Q).
C Technical Appendix
This section establishes the existence of a stationary measure over consumption weights and
endowment states in the approximating equilibrium.
Let B(L) the Borel set of L and let P(Y ) be the power set of Y: The function l(¢) together
with the transition function ¼ jointly de¯ne a Markov transition function on income shocks
and \consumption weights": Q :
¡
L £ Y £ Zk¢
£
¡





















Next, de¯ne the operator that maps one measure into another on the space of probability
measures ¤ over
¡
L £ Y £ Zk¢
£
¡












Suppose there exists a unique, invariant measure over weights, endowments and truncated
aggregate histories, that is there is a stationary measure ¸¤ on (S;S) =
¡
L £ Y £ Zk¢
£
¡
















where Q is the transition function induced by the policy function and the Markov process.



















©zk (d! £ dy):
If I start o® this economy with this measure ¸¤; it keeps reproducing itself and I can de-
¯ne a stationary stochastic equilibrium in which the economy moves stochastically between
aggregate states and associated wealth/endowment distributions.
















zk (d! £ dy)'(y
0jy); (44)
To check that a stationary measure exists, it is su±cient to check a mixing condition (Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott (1989), p. 348).













) ¸ " .
The standard argument can be applied. The weights live on a compact set and the upper
bound max(z0;zk)
l(yn;z0;zk)
g¤(z0;zk) will be reached with positive probability provided that ¼ has no
zero entries, but convergence will be slower for larger k:
47